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Income Distribution in Developing Economies: Conceptual, Data, and Policy 
Issues in Broad-Based Growth 
Gary S. Fields  
Introduction 
The aim of economic development is to raise the standard of living of a country's 
people, especially its poor. Economic growth, particularly when broadly based, is a 
means to that end. 
'Underdevelopment' can be defined as a state of severely constrained choices. 
When one is choosing from among an undesirable set of alternatives, the outcome will 
itself be undesirable. Standards of living will be low. If standards of living are to be 
improved, people must have a better set of alternatives from which to choose. 
'Economic development' is the process by which the constraints on choices are 
relaxed. Based on ample evidence from microeconomic studies (see, for instance, the 
Nobel Prize winning research of T. W. Schultz 1980), we may be confident that when 
poor people in the developing world have better options from which to choose, the 
choices they make will lead them to enjoy better outcomes, hence raising standards of 
living. Accordingly, the task of economic development is to enhance the alternatives 
from which to choose, that is, the 'choice set'. 
'Broad-based growth' means that the choice set is improved for all economic 
strata. There is good reason to expect that the upper and middle classes have many 
mechanisms at their disposal for benefiting from the growth process. These groups gain 
when economic growth takes place. It is less certain whether the poor are also reached 
by growth. 
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Income Distribution and Broad-Based Growth 
 
The case can be made that the poor deserve special attention from development 
analysts and policymakers, because the poor have, or may be presumed to have, the 
greatest needs. Hence the marginal social valuation on their income is higher than it is 
for others. This argument justifies the so-called 'focus axiom', which suggests that we 
focus our attention on the poor (see Sen 1976). 
One philosophical school of thought holds that the proper goal of a society is to 
maximize the well-being of the worst-off person. This criterion, called the 'maximin 
principle', has been developed fully by John Rawls (1971). Maximin adherents would 
accept gains for others, especially the rich, if and only if, such gains raise the well-being 
of the worst-off in society. Development agencies and some developing country 
governments, such as the government of India, have made antipoverty efforts the 
centerpiece of their development plans. 
For political economy reasons, societies do not actually maximize the well-being 
of their worst-off members. In practice, the programs that benefit the poor must offer 
substantial enough benefits to the nonpoor so that they will support these programs, 
both financially and politically. These political economy considerations imply that even if 
the policymakers, themselves, wish to mount propoor programs, there will inevitably be 
a certain amount of benefit accruing to the nonpoor. 
In this connection, the late Arthur Okun (1975) suggested the metaphor of a 
leaky bucket. The bucket carries benefits directed toward target groups. Inevitably, 
there will be a certain amount of leakage, and others will thereby gain. Okun asked, 
How leaky must the leaky bucket be before it's not worth carrying the water? 
The preceding points turn traditional development economics on its head. Rather 
than pursuing economic growth for its own sake and hoping that the benefits will be 
spread widely enough that the poor derive some gain, we might instead ask how 
development efforts might be directed toward the poor, through economic growth and 
other means such as government antipoverty programs and labor market policies. We 
want to be sure that the benefits of growth are broadly enough based that the poor 
participate. It would be tragic indeed if the have-nots are excluded from the growth 
process or, worse yet, impoverished by it. 
In sum, broad-based growth means raising standards of living at all 
socioeconomic levels. As things are, the middle and upper strata probably do not need 
much help—they will benefit if growth takes place. It is the least well-off in society who 
require special attention. Therefore, broad-based growth is best operationalized to 
mean that development efforts are targeted on raising the standards of living of the 
poor. 
 
Patterns of Income Distribution 
 
Development analysts customarily measure standards of living in terms of 
household consumption or income. Ideally, these measures would include the value of 
goods and services provided or subsidized by the public sector (such as government 
housing, food, health care, and education), by employers (for instance, living 
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accommodations for workers or on-the-job meals), and by others (such as 
nongovernmental organizations). In practice, though, the information at our disposal is 
often limited to cash income or expenditures only. 
Suppose that we have such information on income or consumption for two or 
more points in time during which economic growth has taken place. By what criterion 
might we gauge how broadly based are the benefits of such growth? 
One criterion is to see whether an economy has registered gains in real incomes 
or consumption for all groups. If this takes place, we would observe higher real incomes 
in all income quantiles (such as deciles or quintiles). So too absolute poverty, as 
measured by the poverty head- count ratio, the Sen index, or the P-alpha class, would 
be lower. In this case, the new distribution would be said to 'dominate' the old. For more 
on dominance results in poverty analysis, see Atkinson (1987), and Foster and 
Shorrocks (1988). 
The criterion of absolute gains for each group, and hence falling absolute 
poverty, is a weak one. One reason for this is that although groups as a whole gain, 
there may be losses for certain individuals or households within those groups. Another 
reason is that if we find that there have been some gains for all groups this does not tell 
us whether particular target groups have benefited a lot or only a little. 
The criterion for broad-based growth might be made more stringent by looking to 
see whether standards of living have been raised for all individuals or households. This, 
however, is probably too stringent a criterion: it is hard to imagine an economy in which 
there are only winners. Someone invariably loses. Looking on balance at the numbers 
and characteristics of winners compared with losers is more fruitful. 
One way of doing this is to see whether an economy has achieved 
equiproportionate gains for all groups, in proportion to their original economic positions. 
A stricter criterion is to ascertain whether those with greatest need received 
disproportionately large gains. By the first of these criteria, growth would be judged to 
be broad based if inequality is constant, because then each group would have benefited 
proportionately. By the second criterion, we would require that inequality falls, because 
only then will the poor have benefited more than proportionately. 
This suggests two workable criteria that might be used to help determine the 
distributional effects of economic growth: one absolute and one relative. One is to 
determine if real incomes have risen in all strata of the income distribution. If they have, 
then absolute poverty has surely fallen. The second is to determine whether income 
inequality has increased, decreased, or remained unchanged. 
 
Data for Measuring Poverty and Inequality 
 
One would think that the subjects of poverty and inequality are central to the 
assessment of the extent of economic development and that statistical offices of 
governments and development agencies would regularly publish such information. Alas, 
such data are not regularly published anywhere. 
Consider, for instance, the World Bank. The tables at the back of its World 
Development Report are probably the most consulted source for development data in 
the world. However, these tables contain nothing at all on income distribution for most of 
the low income and middle income countries. For those that are included, no 
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information is presented on poverty, no calculation is made of summary measures of 
inequality such as the Gini coefficient, and no information is presented on changes in 
either poverty or inequality over time. What about other World Bank publications? The 
World Bank's Social Indicators of Development would seem a logical place to look. But 
unfortunately, this publication presents data on changing poverty rates over time only 
for two countries, Morocco and Pakistan, and no data at all on changes in inequality. 
Scattered bits of information can be found in other publications of the World Bank if one 
knows where to look (see chapter 3 of the 1990 World Development Report and the, as 
yet, unpublished work of Ravallion 1993). It simply shouldn't be so hard to find. 
What about other international agencies? The United Nations' Human 
Development Report contains poverty head count ratios and Gini coeffi• cients for a 
large number of countries, but no intertemporal data. The State of the World's Children, 
published by the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, has nothing 
on poverty and inequality, nor does the International Labour Organisation's Yearbook of 
Labour Statistics. However, The Incidence of Poverty in Developing Countries: An ILO 
Compendium of Data (Tabatabai 1993) contains much useful information that will inform 
the development community for years to come. 
Researchers interested in measuring broad-based growth have not, until now, 
had access to the compendium of the International Labour Organisation, so have been 
forced to construct their own. In the data base constructed in Fields (1989), countries 
are included if they meet the following criteria: 
 
i. The data on income or expenditure must be derived from an actual household 
survey or census. 
ii. The surveys must be comparable over time. 
iii. The surveys must be national in coverage. 
iv. The data must be presented in enough categories so that reasonable 
calculations of poverty and inequality can be made. 
 
Changing Poverty and Inequality in Various Countries' Experiences 
Changes in Poverty Over Time 
 
To be in 'poverty' means to experience a low living standard. 'Absolute poverty' 
means that the living standard is absolutely low, given the standards of the particular 
society in which one lives. In practice, a person or household falling below a specified 
income/expenditure amount is said to be 'poor'. 
Poverty lines are set very differently in different countries—see, for instance, 
Dreze and Sen (1990), and Quibria (1993) for discussions in the context of Asian 
developing economies. In India, the poverty line was set in a scientific way. The caloric 
and nutrient values of various foods consumed by the poor were measured. The cost of 
an adequate diet was then calculated. To this was added the cost of shelter, clothing, 
and other basic necessities of life. Separate poverty lines were set for urban and rural 
India, reflecting differences in the cost of the basic market basket of goods. Each year, 
these poverty lines are increased in proportion to changes in consumer prices. Thus, 
the poverty line changes in nominal terms but is constant in real terms. 
5 
 
In the Republic of Korea, there is no poverty line. There is, however, a minimum 
wage. Although the Korean minimum wage is a convenient reference point, it has no 
scientific basis; it is determined by government in light of political considerations. 
Minimum wages in countries such as the United States and Brazil are determined in the 
same way. So in the absence of a scientifically determined poverty line for the Republic 
of Korea, the most practical thing to do is to define poverty relative to a reference year's 
minimum wage, adjusting that figure upward for inflation so that the poverty line used is 
constant in real terms. 
Having defined a poverty line and determined whether a given individual or 
household is or is not poor, the next step is to determine how much poverty there is. 
The simplest poverty measure is the percentage of recipient units below the poverty 
threshold. This is called the 'poverty headcount ratio'. It would also be desirable to 
measure two other aspects of economic deprivation: the extent to which the incomes of 
the poor fall below the poverty line, termed the 'average income shortfall' and the extent 
of income inequality among the poor, as measured, say, by the Gini coefficient. Sen's 
poverty index and the P-alpha class include all three of these aspects. However, the 
available tabulations for developing countries do not report these measures or the 
additional data needed to calculate them, so as a practical matter, we are forced to rely 
on the poverty headcount ratio alone. 
What do the poverty data show? The finding, shown in Table 4.1 (appendix), is a 
happy one. Nearly always, when economic growth, as measured by gross national 
product or Internationally Comparable Purchasing Power units per capita, has taken 
place, real incomes of individuals and households have risen and absolute poverty has 
thereby fallen. Using probit analysis, we find that the probability that poverty falls is a 
function of the economic growth rate: the higher the economic growth rate, the more 
likely poverty is to have fallen. 
We find too that in most instances where poverty has risen, aggregate economic 
growth has been very small or even negative. This was true of India in the 1960s. 
Elsewhere, it was also true of Jamaica in the 1970s and of many Latin American 
countries in the 1980s. The same is thought to be true of many African countries as 
well, but because these countries lack household surveys for the beginning of the 
decade, this conjecture cannot be confirmed rigorously. 
In the developing world, the outstanding exception to the generalization that 
poverty increases only in the absence of growth is the Philip• pines during the Marcos 
years. Data compiled by Mijares and Belarmino (1973) show that from 1961 to 1971, 
nominal income growth of the poorest 20 per cent in the Philippines was plus 79 per 
cent while consumer prices rose by 101.6 per cent over the same interval. This implies 
that absolute poverty rose, at least for the poorest 20 per cent. Balisacan (1993), in his 
study of the period between 1965 and 1971, also found a rising poverty headcount ratio 
in the Philippines. Tire most straightforward explanation—crony capitalism—may well 
be the right one. 
The implication of these findings is that more growth can be expected to help all 
income groups including the poor. The poor have benefited absolutely when growth has 
taken place, even when that growth was based on a very unequal initial distribution of 
income. Of course, some kinds of economic growth would undoubtedly be more 
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beneficial for the poor than others. When it is possible to stimulate such kinds of broad- 
based growth, this should indeed be done. 
Some claim that in the absence of fundamental change, the poor will be rendered 
poorer by economic growth, and for this reason it is better not to grow at all. This claim 
is not supported by the bulk of the evidence. Even in very inegalitarian countries such 
as Brazil and Mexico, growth on the existing economic base has been better for the 
poor than no growth. Whenever possible, the first-best kinds of broad-based growth 
policies should be sought. But when political realities render the first-best unattainable, 
the second-best will probably still achieve growth. 
 
Changes in Inequality Over Time 
 
Another criterion for determining whether growth is broad based or not is the 
change in relative income inequality. Studying 'inequality' means comparing one group's 
income change relative to another's or to the average in an economy as a whole. When 
the comparison is made on the basis of income ratios, rather than income differences, 
the comparison is one of 'relative inequality'. Most often, income is the basis for such 
comparisons, although expenditures sometimes are used instead. 
Ever since Simon Kuznets' path-breaking work on economic growth and income 
inequality in 1955, relative income inequality measures have been the basis for 
comparisons. The most commonly used relative inequality measures are the income 
shares of particular quantile groups and Gini coefficients. 
Kuznets himself, and many others who followed, used cross-sectional data to 
derive empirical inferences about the supposed relationship between inequality and 
economic growth. It was well understood that this was not the ideal methodology— 
looking over time within individual countries' development experiences would clearly 
have been better—but with the data then available, this could not be done. One 
investigator whose empirical work was extremely influential, Montek Ahluwalia (1976, p. 
307), was quite explicit about this: 
 
The use of cross country data for the analysis of what are essentially dynamic 
processes raises a number of familiar problems. Ideally, such processes should 
be examined in an explicitly historical context for particular countries. 
Unfortunately, time series data on the distribution of income, over any substantial 
period, are simply not available for most developing countries. For the present, 
therefore, empirical investigation in this field must perforce draw heavily on cross 
country experience. 
 
Kuznets suggested, and a long series of cross-section studies seemed 
to confirm, that inequality tends to increase in the early stages of economic growth and 
to decrease in the later stages.2 But intertemporal studies of individual countries, 
including the work of Kuznets himself (1955), revealed no pronounced tendency one 
way or the other.3 We know now that Kuznets' curve was an inverted-U shape because 
of the use of cross-sectional data; panel data methods turn the shape of the curve 
around to an ordinary U (Fields and Jakubson 1992). 
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Using the Gini coefficient as the inequality measure, data on inequality are 
presented in Table 4.2 (appendix). (As with the choice of the poverty headcount ratio to 
measure poverty, the choice of the Gini coefficient is on purely practical grounds: many 
countries publish Gini coefficients but not other inequality measures.) Taking the criteria 
discussed earlier, we might ask, How broad based is economic growth? Are the gains 
for the poor sufficiently large that the Gini coefficient falls? Do the poor benefit 
equiproportionately from economic growth, thus keeping the Gini coefficient 
unchanged? Or do the poor benefit less than the nonpoor, so that the Gini coefficient 
increases? 
The evidence on Kuznets' curve and related hypotheses is decisively indecisive: 
there is no pattern to the observed changes. In fact, the testing of four hypotheses 
elicited the following results: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Inequality tends to change systematically in developing countries. 
Result: No pattern is found. Rather, inequality increases in half the countries' 
growth experiences and decreases in the other half. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Inequality tends to increase in the early stages of economic 
development and to decrease in the latter stages. 
Result: This hypothesis also is refuted. In cross-sectional data, inequality is 
higher for middle income developing countries than in those that are either richer or 
poorer. The developing countries were therefore divided into two groups: those with 
incomes below the turning point and those with incomes above the turning point. 
Kuznets' hypothesis would predict that the first group of countries would have inequality 
that rises with growth, and, the second, inequality that falls with growth. However, 
inequality rises as often in the lower income developing countries as it does in the 
higher income developing countries. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Inequality is more likely to increase in fast-growing developing 
economies than in slow-growing ones. 
Result: Again, the evidence fails to confirm the hypothesis. Instead, we find that 
the rates are the same: inequality rises with the same frequency in the fast-growing 
developing economies as in the slow-growing ones. 
 
Hypothesis 4: A more unequal initial distribution of income leads to a faster 
subsequent rate of economic growth. 
Result: False again. The initial inequality in the distribution of income has 
nothing to do with the subsequent rate of economic growth. 
 
These results establish that when changes over time are measured, there is no 
empirical tendency whatsoever in the inequality-development relationship. If inequality 
does not tend to increase before it decreases, to fall with economic growth (or to rise), 
or to change systematically with the rate of economic growth, it must be that it is not the 
rate of economic growth, but rather the type of economic growth, that determines the 
extent to which the poor share in the growth process. 
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Furthermore, even when inequality has changed, the changes have almost 
always been small in magnitude. Thus, Brazil remains a relatively high inequality 
country, Costa Rica, a middle inequality country, and Taipei,China, a low inequality 
country. Maintaining present inequality levels means that for a very inegalitarian country 
like Brazil, the poorest quintile will get about 2 per cent of the benefits of growth and the 
richest quintile about 68 per cent. For a more egalitarian country, like the People's 
Republic of China, the corresponding figures are 6 per cent and 42 per cent (Chen, 
Datt, and Ravallion 1993). 
For the poor to receive a larger share of the benefits of growth, reforms are 
needed, along the lines discussed below. These policies will not necessarily slow the 
economy's growth rate; indeed, the finding for hypothesis 4 above and other recent 
studies (Waldmann 1992; Alesina and Rodrik 1993; and Persson and Tabellini 1993) 
show that those countries with a more equal initial distribution of income grow as fast or 
faster than others. Growth being broadly based is good not just for the poor; it is good 
for growth too. 
 
Broad-Based Growth in East Asia 
 
For economic growth to have broad-based effects, there must be mechanisms 
for transmitting gains throughout the economy, especially to the poor. The single most 
important asset of the poor is their labor. It follows that economic growth can reach the 
poor if it increases the demand for their labor, increases the demand for the products of 
their labor, or provides complementary inputs with which to make their labor more 
productive. 
The most outstanding examples of broad-based economic improvements over a 
sustained period of time are the newly industrializing economies (NIEs) of East Asia 
(Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taipei,China). Their labor market and 
income distribution experiences, presented in Appendix Tables 4.3 and 4.4, present a 
picture of extraordinary improvements. 
In these economies, as firms expanded output, they also expanded their demand 
for labor. Labor-intensive growth first succeeded in leading to full employment in 
previously labor-abundant economies. When the Lewis-Fei-Ranis turning point was 
reached so that an additional supply of labor was no longer forthcoming at prevailing 
wage rates, firms that wished to expand output and employment further were forced to 
raise real wages in order to attract sufficient labor. They could have decided not to pay 
the higher wages, not to increase employment, and hence not to grow, and indeed 
some firms made exactly this choice— textile producers being perhaps the best known 
example. But so many other firms were willing to pay the higher costs that real labor 
earnings increased year after year in industry upon industry. Real wages through• out 
these economies rose apace with economic growth as a whole. See Table 4.5 
(appendix). Unemployment rates of just 1 or 2 per cent prevailed for decades. 
As labor markets tightened, the mix of employment improved: the fractions of 
workers in agriculture (a relatively low-paying sector) fell; wage employees, as a 
percentage of total employment, increased, as did the proportions of workers in the 
highest occupational categories. The educational levels of the employed population 
improved as well. The rapidly rising real wages and improved mix of jobs among a labor 
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force with very little unemployment led to sharply falling rates of poverty and low to 
moderate levels of inequality. 
There are arguments that the pursuit of broad-based growth through tightening 
labor markets leads to a dialectical contradiction: that the very act of stimulating labor 
demand raises wages and/or generates labor shortages, choking off the very growth it 
was designed to stimulate. So far, this hasn't happened—30 years of official and 
professional lamentation over wage increases notwithstanding. Perhaps developing 
economies have a lot of room for maneuvering before this becomes a problem. 
In full employment economies, the only thing worse than rising real wages would 
be for wages not to rise. If wages are held below market• clearing levels, how would 
companies deal with the resultant labor shortages? Wouldn't economic growth be 
slowed? Wouldn't the rate of improvement of standards of living be curtailed? What is 
growth for? 
The 'Asian Miracle' bears careful study, and indeed is receiving such study both 
from empiricists and from theorists. 
 
Policies Producing Broad-Based Growth 
 
In a short paper such as this, space does not permit for more than a brief 
analysis of a few of the major factors that determine how conducive various types of 
growth have been to producing broad-based economic participation. 
The first points discussed in this section relate to labor returns directly. These 
include policies that favor the full utilization of labor and policies that affect what labor 
has to work with, namely land and education. The section continues to discuss two 
aspects of the economic environment that have proved central to determining how 
broadly based economic growth is: the interrelation between government regulation and 
private enterprise, and countries' trade and industrialization strategies. 
 
Policies that Favor the Full Utilization of Labor 
 
Two types of 'distortions' in labor markets are to be avoided (Fields 1993). The 
first involves policies to raise the returns to labor prematurely, before employers are 
ready to pay the higher labor costs. Unless we believe that labor demand curves are not 
downward sloping, we would have to expect that excessively high wages would reduce 
both employment and output. The other labor market distortion to avoid is labor market 
repression. Labor market repression is neither necessary nor desirable for economic 
growth, quite apart from the severe social consequences that it has. Policies that favor 
full utilization of labor should therefore be sought. 
Because developing economies are labor abundant and because labor is the 
chief asset of the poor, it stands to reason that economic growth of a labor-intensive 
character would not only be efficient relative to capital- intensive development but it 
would also benefit the poor more than would capital-intensive growth. Indeed, the 
evidence presented earlier shows exactly that. 
Labor-intensive growth has another advantage: prejudicial behavior becomes 
increasingly costly for employers. In the Far East, an important group of beneficiaries 
from tight labor markets was women, whose employment opportunities expanded 
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greatly. Women have yet to attain economic and social equality with men in that part of 
the world, but the gap is narrowing. 
This raises the question of how best to create more and better jobs. Real wages 
have plummeted in many countries in Latin America and Africa and yet employment has 
increased little. This suggests that developing countries may have little scope for 
increasing employment through wage cutting. It may be that a better way is to increase 
production and hence shift the derived demand for labor. 
 
Distribution of Productive Assets: Education 
 
As the quantity of labor demanded in the labor market is important, so is the 
quality of the labor process, that is, the skills workers bring to the labor market and the 
inputs they have to work with. 
Education makes people more productive. Notwithstanding arguments about 
credentialism, screening, and low quality and inappropriate curricula, there can be no 
doubt that genuine human capital formation takes place in schools in developing 
countries. 
Due to scarcity of resources, education in the developing world is neither 
universal nor free. Typically, the education ministry has a certain agreed-upon budget to 
be divided among various levels and qualities of educational inputs. As a result, more of 
one type of education necessarily means less of another. 
How should education dollars best be spent? The most efficient allocation of 
resources would be the one that yields the highest social benefit per dollar spent. 
Typically, the social cost of a year of higher education is many times that of a year of 
primary education. Cost ratios of 20, 30, or 40 to 1 are not uncommon. One college 
graduate is probably not 20, 30, or 40 times as valuable to the society as one primary 
school graduate. So on efficiency grounds, resources would probably best be allocated 
to primary education. The egalitarian allocation of resources would be the allocation 
with the most equal possible outcome. Spending the marginal educational dollars on 20, 
30, or 40 children who would otherwise be unschooled rather than on one person who 
already has a relatively high level of schooling would also be preferable on equity 
grounds. 
This illustrates that in allocating resources to education, there may be no tradeoff 
between efficiency and equity: spending the marginal educational dollars on primary 
education rather than higher education may add more to the productive capacity of 
workers in the economy and spread the benefits of economic growth more widely. 
More research is needed on the empirical effects of educational expansion. We need to 
know more about how labor markets adjust when more workers are educated. What 
kinds of jobs do the graduates get? How much more productive are they in those jobs 
with education than they or others might have been without the education? What 
happens to the less educated persons who are displaced by the better educated? What 
kinds of jobs do they get? After taking account of the possible reallocation of the labor 
force among jobs and the changes in productivity in each, how much is output 
enhanced when the labor force is better educated? 
 
Distribution of Productive Assets: Land 
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As with the allocation of educational resources, there may be no tradeoff 
between equity and efficiency when land is considered. After labor, land is the next 
most important asset of people in developing countries. In the early post World War II 
period, both the Republic of Korea and Taipei, China had major land reforms. Singapore 
and Hong Kong, being city states, faced no significant inequality of land ownership. 
Thus, in all four of the East Asian NIEs, postwar economic development was based on 
a relatively egalitarian foundation. 
An initially egalitarian distribution of land and other assets has three principal 
advantages. One is the direct effect of the assets in generating incomes, hence 
spreading the benefits of growth to those at the bottom of the economic scale. Second, 
ample research shows that small farms have higher yields per acre. Thus, on efficiency 
grounds, the presumption is that a more equal distribution of land would raise total 
agricultural productivity. The third advantage is political. Landed oligarchies can be 
extraordinarily powerful, often channeling public decisions toward their own personal 
gain rather than toward the larger social interest. It may well be because of the land 
reforms that the influence of landed oligarchies was much more limited in the Republic 
of Korea and Taipei, China than it was, and is, in the Philippines or Brazil. 
Land reform can be a valuable ingredient in helping achieve broad- based growth 
in some cases, but not necessarily in all (see the paper by Rashid and Quibria in this 
volume for a more pessimistic view). But even when it is not possible to equalize the 
distribution of productive assets, growth will probably still be beneficial for the poor. 
 
Government Regulation and Private Enterprise 
 
There are two kinds of governments: those that mean well and those that don't. 
There are also two kinds of private enterprises: those that behave decently and those 
that will do whatever it takes to maximize the returns from their activities. Well-meaning 
governments often regulate their economies in the hopes of effecting better outcomes. 
At times, these regulations offer genuine protection against abuses that would otherwise 
occur. The question is how to strike the right balance between the legitimate interests of 
workers to earn fair wages and work in decent conditions, consumers to receive fair 
value for price paid, and businesses to earn profits. 
To illustrate how such a balance might be struck, let us consider the regulation of 
labor markets. Most developing countries have abundant labor relative to other factors 
of production. When economic growth has not been labor intensive, it has often been 
because of efforts to legislate higher than market returns to labor. Among the 
mechanisms for doing this are minimum wages, encouragement of unions7 wage 
bargaining efforts, public sector employment creation at above-market wages, and 
ambitious labor codes. 
These efforts, though well intentioned, ignore the fact that higher wages for 
workers mean higher labor costs for employers, thus creating an incentive for firms to 
economize on the use of labor by not employing as many people. Some firms respond 
by substituting capital in place of labor. Others cut back on their output levels, using less 
of both capital and labor to produce less output. Others use less of one country's labor 
by moving offshore and hiring workers elsewhere. 
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Premature wage increases have predictable side effects. It is no accident that the 
forces leading to premature wage increases have been largely absent from the East 
Asian economies, which not only have achieved rapid economic growth but also rapidly 
rising real earnings. The labor market policies conducive to broad-based improvements 
in labor market rewards are those that pull the poor along when the economy grows, not 
those that push wages and working conditions up in the hope that the rest of the 
economy will somehow absorb these increases. 
This is not an argument for a completely unregulated labor market. Far from it. 
Essential freedoms must be guaranteed and decent treatment assured. Labor markets 
must be regulated to prevent abusive practices. No person should have to endure such 
abuses as slavery, indentured servitude, restrictions on freedom of association or 
collective bargaining, unknowing exposure of workers to unsafe or unhealthy working 
conditions, or the employment of children for long work hours simply because they are 
cheaper to hire than adults. And no country should knowingly permit such abuses. 
As a working rule, a very simple question may be asked, Is a particular way of 
doing things a  socially acceptable  procedure for undertaking economic activity? If 
the answer is no, as it is for slavery, for example, then that procedure is properly 
outlawed. But when the procedure is not inherently objectionable, the creative energies 
of the various participants may best be harnessed in a well-functioning labor market. 
Research is needed to determine when regulations have impeded desirable private 
enterprise adjustments and, equally importantly, when regulations have prevented 
private enterprise from engaging in socially undesirable actions. Regulations in labor 
markets would be a good place to start such research. 
 
Trade and Industrialization Strategies 
 
The evidence is compelling that outward-oriented trade and industrialization 
strategies are better than inward-looking strategies, not only for raising the rate of 
aggregate economic growth but also for achieving more broad-based economic growth. 
As discussed above, the most spectacular economic growth successes of the post- 
World War II period have been in East Asia: Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, the 
Republic of Korea, and Taipei, China. These economies have low to moderate levels of 
inequality by international standards. They have all maintained essentially full 
employment and rapidly rising real wages. Poverty has fallen rapidly. And all achieved 
their successes through export-led growth. 
The value of being able to sell profitably in foreign markets can hardly be 
questioned. Exporting is good for the export firms, for their suppliers, and for their 
workers. To be able to sell profitably in world markets means that the home-produced 
good is comparable in quality and price to the best foreign products (otherwise foreign 
buyers would buy elsewhere), and this means that domestic consumers also benefit. 
Using additional labor to produce for export brings about heightened competition in 
these countries' labor markets, thus spreading the benefits to workers in all parts of the 
economy, including those in nonexportables and agriculture. 
When considering the benefits of exporting profitably, the word 'profitable' is the 
key. Why do some countries insist on exporting unprofitably? Yes, flying the national 
flag on a jumbo jet is a source of national pride, but isn't there a better way for man not 
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to live by bread alone? Sociocultural factors aside, the only economically defensible 
reason to export unprofitably is as an investment in profitable activities for the future. 
Such investments might be warranted, at least temporarily, in order to learn by doing, to 
set up a marketing network, or to establish a reputation for quality. It was apparently for 
reasons such as these that the  governments of  Japan and the  Republic  of  Korea 
required that companies increase their exports as a condition for maintaining licenses, 
access to foreign exchange, and other government-conferred benefits. 
As has now become clear, the East Asian NIEs did not follow identical trade and 
industrialization strategies; some were much more dirigiste than others. What the East 
Asian economies did share was a belief that they could achieve rapid, broad-based 
growth by producing for the world market. Judging by the record, they were quite right. 
One reason the East Asian NIEs succeeded is that they chose their trade and 
industrialization policies with careful attention to comparative advantage. Of equal if not 
greater importance is that those countries adapted their policies when comparative 
advantage shifted. Textile exports rose and then fell. So too did exports of heavy 
machinery and, more recently, of consumer electronics. It would be interesting to know 
more than we now do about how public policy fostered appropriate responses to 
changing comparative advantage. 
 
Policy-Relevant Basic Development Research 
 
Despite all that is known, more research is needed. Seven topics merit high 
priority for understanding development processes and formulating appropriate 
development policies, yet they may be lost amidst calls for research on other, more 
directly applied, topics. 
1.  Additional Country Studies. The experiences of the East Asian NIEs offer 
persuasive evidence to many, that growth can have very positive distributional 
effects. Yet, these are only four economies, and rather special ones at that. More 
country studies are needed, building, of course, on the many high quality studies 
that have already been carried out by researchers within the countries. A good 
place to start would be with those Southeast Asian economies (Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines) that aspire to be the 'next NIEs' to see 
how their income distributions and labor market conditions have changed. It 
would be interesting and worthwhile to compare the experiences of these 
economies with the experiences of South Asian economies and select Latin 
American economies. 
2.  Determinants of Constraints on Choices. Basic economics courses teach that 
individuals make maximizing choices subject to constraints. While we have 
learned a great deal about the choices individuals make given the constraints 
they face, we know a great deal less about how the constraints are determined. 
The 'choice set' is the set of opportunities from which choices are made. Choice 
sets are determined by macroeconomic conditions, public policies and strategies, 
markets, institutions, and the summation of individual behavior. But how precisely 
do these factors interact? More work is needed at the level of the market and 
intermarket analysis—what some now call the 'meso' level. 
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3.  Coping Strategies. Over time, choice sets change. Individuals and households 
cope with these changes and reoptimize. How does behavior change with 
economic growth and decline? Are the adjustments symmetric, or do individuals 
and markets respond differently on the downswing than they did on the upswing? 
When macroeconomic conditions change or when policy reforms are undertaken, 
which institutional arrangements facilitate smooth adjustments? We need to 
know much more than we do about coping strategies and their determinants. 
4.  Labor Market Functioning. Labor market studies too often consist of descriptive 
information on rates of unemployment, employment patterns, labor supply, and 
earnings functions. We know too little about how labor markets actually function. 
How integrated or segmented are various countries' labor markets? What 
determines the amount of employment in each major sector or segment? What 
determines levels of earnings and changes in earnings in various parts of a 
country's labor market? How do education and labor markets interact? We need 
more behavioral studies of the labor markets of developing countries—in the best 
sense of the term— to 'get the story right'. 
5.  Informal Sector. Uncharacteristically of our profession, we talk a lot about the 
informal sector without having defined clearly what we mean by it. This term 
means many things to many people. A clear definition is needed. If the 'informal 
sector' consists of more than one tier, then we need to look at each tier 
separately and ask, Why are people in each part of the informal sector? What are 
the determinants of incomes in each? How might income opportunities be 
improved in each? Considering the costs, as well as benefits, is the solution to be 
found within the informal sector or outside of it? 
6.  Dynamics of Growth. After a long hiatus, economists are once again building 
formal theoretical models of economic growth. These models analyze various 
'engines of growth' including technological change, positive externalities, human 
capital formation, quality upgrading, new product development, cost reductions, 
research and development, and international trade. Including these factors in 
formal models is a most welcome development. However, as with earlier formal 
growth models, the new models are emphasizing equilibrium growth paths, 
whereas the evolution of economies when they are out of equilibrium is of much 
more interest to development economists and policymakers. We need to adapt 
these new models to the study of nonsteady state growth dynamics. We also 
need empirical case studies, including both successful instances of market 
penetration (such as textiles and electronics) and nonsuccesses. The insights 
from these case studies should then be used to guide further theoretical 
modeling efforts. 
7.  Economic Mobility. To supplement the data on changes in poverty and inequality, 
which give a series of snapshots, it is important also to know what happens over 
time to given individuals. To what extent do people move up or down within the 
income distribution? Which groups have higher rates of mobility than others? 
How much of the observed economic mobility can be accounted for by 
movements of individuals within  a given income structure and how much  by 
a change  in the structure itself? Questions like these can be answered, but only 
with longitudinal data that, unfortunately, are not yet generally available for the 
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developing countries of Asia or elsewhere. Therefore, such research must 
necessarily be postponed to the more distant future. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The main points of this paper may be summed up as follows: 
 The concern with distributional aspects of economic development is 
motivated by a concern for broad-based growth. Measures for determining 
how broadly based growth has been fall into two categories: those that 
look at absolute changes in real incomes for the poor or other target 
groups, and those that compare one group's rate of income change with 
another's. Analysts need to decide first whether they are concerned 
primarily with changes in absolute poverty or in relative inequality, or 
whether they are equally concerned with both, for only then can they go to 
the available distributional statistics to see what has happened to the 
variables that concern them. 
 The available evidence on the distributional effects of growth gives a 
completely different impression depending on which distributional 
approach is adopted. For reasons of intellectual history (such as Kuznets' 
pathbreaking work), economists and other social scientists devoted a 
great deal of attention to the effects of economic growth on relative 
income inequality. Notwithstanding Kuznets' hypotheses and subsequent 
cross-sectional evidence, we now know from current data that there is no 
relationship between economic growth and changing income inequality. 
Put in the terms used in the literature, not only does income distribution 
not have to get worse before it gets better, it does not even tend to. As for 
absolute poverty, the evidence is quite pronounced: nearly always when 
growth takes place, poverty falls; when poverty doesn't fall, it is because 
growth has not taken place. 
 The rapid economic growth achieved by the newly industrializing 
economies of East Asia (Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, Singapore, and 
Taipei, China) has led to marked distributional improvements. These 
economies have had sustained records of full employment, improving job 
mix, rising real wages, falling absolute poverty, and low to moderate levels 
of income inequality. Their rates of improvement are the envy of the rest of 
the world. 
 From country studies, we have learned that certain development policies 
are associated with better distributional outcomes than others. The key 
factors identified here are labor market policies, the distribution of 
education, the distribution of land, government regulation and private 
enterprise, and trade and industrialization strategies. 
 More remains to be learned. High priority research areas are additional 
country studies, the determinants of constraints on choices, coping 
strategies of individuals and households, labor market functioning, the role 
of the informal sector, the dynamics of growth outside of the steady state, 
and economic mobility. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Ta ble4A.1 
Change in Poverty and Rates of Growth, Spell Analysis 
 
Part A: Change in Poverty and Growth Rate of GNP per Capita 
 
 
 
 
Spell 
Growth Rate of 
GNP per Capito 
(per cent)  Cltange i11 Poverty 
 
 
Costa Rica, 1979·1982 
Jamaica, 1973-1979 
Bangladesh, 1966/67-1973/74 
 
-5.7 
-5.3 
-2.3 
 
Pover ty increased 
Poverty increased 
Mixed evidence• 
Pakistan,1969/70-1979 1.4 Poverty decreased 
Bangladesh, 1976/77-1981/82 1.6 Mixed evidence• 
India, 1977/78-1983 2.0 Poverty decreased 
Sri Lanka,1963-1973 2.3 Poverty decreased 
Sri Lanka, 1978/ 79-1981/82 3.0 Mixed evidence' 
Sri Lanka, 1973-1978/79 3.0 Poverty decreased 
India, 1973/74-1977/78 3.1 Poverty decreased 
Mexico, 1969-1977 3.3 Poverty decreased 
Malaysia,1979-1984 3.8 Poverty decreased 
Jamaica, 1%8-1973 4.0 Poverty increased 
Thailand, 1968/69-1975/76 4.0 Poverty decreased 
Mexico, 1963-1969 4.2 Pover ty decreased 
Bangladesh, 1973/74-1976/77 43 Poverty increased 
Korea, RepubUc of, 1976-1980 43 Poverty decreased 
Indonesia,1978-9!80 4.5 Poverty decreased 
Thailand,1975/76-1981 4.6 Pover ty decreased 
Hong Kong, 1966-1971 4.8 Poverty decreased 
Indonesia, 1970-1976 4.8 Pover ty decreased 
Thailand, 1962/63-1968/69 4.8 Pover ty decreased 
Indonesia, 1976-1978 5.0 Poverty decreased 
Malaysia, 1976-1979 5.0 Poverty decreased 
Malaysia, 1970·1976 5.2 Poverty decreased 
Brazil., 1970-1980 5.7 Poverty decreased 
Hong Kong, 1971-1976 6.2 Poverty decreased 
Singapore, 1975-1980 6.8 Poverty decreased 
Korea, Republic of, 1965-1970 7.0 Poverty decreased 
Korea, Republic of, 1970-1976 7.2 Poverty decreased 
Singapore, 1966-1975 8.4 Poverty decreased 
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'1971 .435 
!975 .523 
1977 .481 
1979 .625 
 
1958/59 .42 
1964/65 .40 
1974/75 .38 
 
1968/69 .29 
1973/74 .36 
1976/77 .45 
1981/82 .39 
 
1961 .50 
1971 .43 
1977 .49 
1979 .45 
1982 .42 
 
Table A4.2 
Gini Coefficients in 35 Developing Economies 
 
BAHAMAS 
Gini coefficient of income 
among lrou seltolds 
COTE D'IVOIRE 
Gini coefticiellt ofi•ouseltold income 
1985 .553 
EGYPT 
Gini cotfftcient of household expenditure 
 
 
BANGLADESH 
Gi11i coefficient oflrou selrold inconu:s 
 
 
 
 
 
BRAZIL 
Gini coefficient of monetary income 
mnong households 
1960 .53 
1970 .59 
1972 .61 
Gini coefficient of 'total gross personal 
iucome'  among  !Jouseltolds 
1976 .60 
1978 .56 
1980 .56 
1983 .57 
CHILE 
Gini coefficient of family i11come 
1968 .46 
1971 .46 
COLOMBIA 
Gini c.oejficitmt of i ncome among 
tconomicnlly active persons 
1971 .57 
COSTA 1/CA 
Gini coefficient of i11come 
amoug households 
 
 
ELSALVADOR 
Cini crefficient of lrousehold income 
1976/77 .40 
 
FIJI 
Gini cofJficienl ()f income among 
l•ouseholds, unadjusted 
1977 .425 
HONDURAS 
c;,,; coefficient of income 
among houseJJolds 
1967/68 .62 
HONG KONG 
Cini  coefficient  of one uwntl1 income 
among houselwlds: 
1966 .49 
'1971 .43 
1976 .43 
1981 .45 
INDIA 
Cini coefficient of income 
nn101tg l•o11selrolds 
1975/76  .416 
 
INDONESIA 
Cini coefficient of per en pita expendit11re 
1964 .333 
1967 .327 
1970 .307 
1976 .318 
1978 .348 
1980 .318 
1981 .309 
1984 .308 
 
(Cautimurl mxt poge) 
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Ill. Rent wages or eorflings 
 
1976 100.0' 
 
1960   105.0' 1980'' 
 
1%6   52.0' 1966  10().0' 
 
1954 
 
100.0' 1971 1 00.0" 
 1980 125.7 1%5   157.0 M<m <69.0 1972     88.0 1975  100.0 1%0 102.0 1978 124.0 
   1970  167.0 Women 76.0 1978   154.0 1975  100.0' 1970 183.0   
   1975  194.0  1980   159.0 1900  120.0 1979 400.0   
   IYSO   253.0        
IV.  Poverty  1966 18.0' 1968 70.0' 1%5 41.0' 1966 37.()"' 19(,4 35.0' 1971/72 8.0' 
1971 11.0 1973 72.0 1970 23.0 1975 29.0 1972 10.0 1975/76 94.0 
1976 7.0 1979 80.0 1 9?6 15.0 1980 18.0 1964 80.0' 1971/72 19.0' 
VI.   l.nequaUty, as measured   1966 0.487 1968 (0.628! 1964 0.34 1966 (0.499( 195W 0.50 1971/72 0.5339 
by GiN coeftlcient among   1971 0.411 1973 [0.651! 1970 0.33 1975 (0.452! 1972' 0.30 1975/76 0.47 
houshotd{Ginj<:oeffidcnt 
among individtntls in bt.lckcts) 
 
1981 
 
0.447 
1976 0.435 1980 [0.6551 1976 0.38 1900 (0.455! 19781 0.27   
 
- ::. Time series in/ormationJlOt available. 
' Figure for period 1965-66. 
"' lndt"x ol averagr<.'<'ll wage.1976;  100. 
( lndex; of average  real manufacturing  wage, 1948::100. 
.:-   index of average wages, 1975:  100. 
• (ndex of r-ealearnings, 1915 = 100. 
' Index of real i..ncome per worker, 1966 = 100. 
' Indx of real manufacturing ei'lmings, 1954 a lOO. 
" lndex of real weekly earningsof producrion workers$ 1971-= 100. 
' Index of reo.I weekly earnings,aU 1Ildustries, 1975 ::: 100. 
1 %of households with afUlual int':oOles l-ess than Hl<$3.000. in constant  1966 HK$. 
1 %of labor force with weeki)'incomes less than )S20,in constant 1973 }$. 
1 %of househnlds with i.rtcomesbelow a constant realpoverty line. 
.a %of persons with incomes below S$200 p<'t month in 1975 pr;ces. 
.. %of households with inrornes below sped.fled iJgure in spl'cifled year: NTS20,000. 
"'  Average incomc of specified group in constant 19'71 /1211'S$: Poorest quartile. 
p NT$40.000. 
' Median. 
' Figurclor early 1950's. 
1 Figure for period 1968-72. 
' Figu..., for period 1976-78. 
(:..,,.,.,..,..,   c;,.l ..4.-   ("'    <:   tnvd  •• t:....,... l ,..,,.......,,.....   J....,..,....,.,.r"\;..,.,.;1.., ..,;,..,..   .., ....4C.....,.....,.....;,.("'..,..,,.,oi..."'T'I•",:o,...,.,.,,,,;,.. J,..,. .,,.t(IAI\.A.., ..,..).\."7A .Q'l 
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Table A4.4 
Changes in Labor Market Condifiions and Income Distribution 
in Four Newly Industrializing Economies in the 1980s 
 
Hong Kong Korea,Rep.of Si11gapore Taipei,China 
 
 
I. Unemployment rate (%) 
1980 3.8 52 3.1 1.2 
1981 3.5 4.5 2.9 1.4 
1982 3.8 4.4 2.6 2.1 
1983 4.1 4.1 3.2 2.7 
1984 3.8 3.9 2.7 2.4 
1985 3.3 4.0 4.1 2.9 
1986 2.6 3.8 6.5 2.7 
1987 1.9 3.1 4.7 2.0 
1988 1.5 2.5 3.3 1.7 
1989 1.4 2.6 2.2 1.6 
1990 1.7 2.4 2.0 1.7 
 
II. Employment composition 
A. Agricu lture as a% of total employment 
!980  34.0 1.75 19.5 
1981 2.0 34.2 1.49 18.8 
1982  '32.1 1.35 18.9 
1983  29.7 1.34 18.6 
1984  27.1 1.08 17.6 
1985  24.9 1.11 17.5 
1986 1.8 23.6 1.20 17.0 
1987  21.9 .87 15.3 
1988  20.7 .72 13.7 
1989  19.5 .71 12.9 
1990  18.3 .32 12.8 
 
B. Employees as o/o of total employment 
1980  47.3 85.0 64.4 
1981 88.5 ·47.2 85.1 64.3 
1982  47.6 84.7 64.1 
1983  49.5 84.3 63.8 
1984  52.9 84.4 64.4 
1985  54.1 84.4 64.1 
1986 87.4 54.4 84.4 64.7 
1987  56.2 84.2 66.7 
1988  57.0 85.4 67.1 
1989  59.1 85.6 67.4 
1990  {)0.2 87.5' 65.6 
(COJ i tiuued 011 ntXIpnge ) 
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Table A4.4 (Continued) 
 
Hong Ko11g Koren,Rep. of Singapnre Taipei,Citina 
 
 
C. Professional & technical. administrative & managerial, clerical, 
and sales occupations as% of total employment 
1980 -· 29.0 42.9 31.8 
1981 30.8 29.2 42.8 32.7 
1982  30.6 44.2 33.1 
1983  32.1 45.5 33.4 
1984  32.9 46.5 33.7 
1985  34.3 46 5 34.2 
1986 37.9 34.3 46.2 34.3 
1987  34.1 47.0 35.1 
1988  34.6 461 37.2 
1989  35.4 46.8 38.5 
1990  36.2 60.0" 39.8 
 
D. %of employed workers with no schooling 
1%0   y 25.2 9.8[6.7]• 
1981  49.9 24.5 9.4 (6.5) 
1982  45.7 24.9 8.9 [6.3) 
1983  43.2 23.3 8.9 [6.5] 
1984  39.6 20.7 8.6 [6.2) 
1985  37.7 22.8 8.2 [6.0] 
1986  35.6 22.1 8.0 [5.6) 
1987  33.7 23.1 7.1[5.1) 
1988  31.7 19.5 6.2 [4.3] 
1989  30.3 19.4 5.7(3.9) 
1990  29.3   5.1[3.6) 
 
Ill. Real wages or earnings 
1980 100.0' 100.<f 100.0g 100.0h 
1981 102.0 98.9 105.5 1020 
1982 107.0 105.9 116.9 108.7 
1983 106.0 114.6 125.9 114.1 
1984 114.0 120.7 134.1 124.0 
1985 119.0 129.7 146.6 129.5 
1986 132.0 137.8 151.1 141.6 
1987 140.0 149.0 152.9 154.8 
1988 147.0 165.6 158.4 169.5 
1989 155.0 195.3 170.4 186.0 
1990 160.0 215.8 179.8 202.7 
(Contlnued ouuext pngt) 
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 30.7' 
5.3 32.9 
8.6 32.6 
7.3 29.0 
6.2 24.9 
5.6 23.9 
5.3  26. 1" 20.8 
5.7 18.5 
5.5 15.2 
5.6 13.4 
5.3  
 
Table A4.4 (Colllinued) 
 
 
 
Korea,Rep. of Singapore Taipei,China 
 
IV. Poverty 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
_; 4.81 -· 
28.5 
 
 
 
 
 
18.3 
 
V. Inequality, as measured  by Gini coefficient of income among households 
1980  .3891°  0.27  
1981 .414   0.281 
1982   .418P 0.283 
1983    0.287 
1984    0.287 
1985  .3449  0.290 
1986 .388   0.296 
1987   .402q 0.299 
1988    0.303 
1989    0.303 
1990  .2886  0.312 
 
'Hong Kong total employed includes unemployed who have previously held jobs. 
\990 figures inc-Jude service workers. 
c% illiterate. 
•% with prelimina ry school. 
• Index of average real manufacturing  wage. 
' Index of average real monthly earnings in mining and manufacturing. 
'Index of average real monthly income. 
h Index of average monthly manufacturing earnings. 
'% of households with monthl)'income less than Hl<$2,000, in 198) prices. 
1%of livelihood protecHon perSons in total populaHon. 
•% of households with monthly incomeless than SS!,OOO in 1982/83 prices. 
1% of households with monthly income Jess than NT$200,000 in 1986 prices. 
Figure for 1982/83. 
• Figure for 1987/88. 
o Gi.n.i coefficient of urban income. 
> Figutelor 1982/83. 
• f igure lor 1987/88. 
Source: Fields, Cary, 1993."Changi ng Labor Market Conditions and Economic Development in 
Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan." Paper prepared for the East Asian Miracle Project. 
Revised version. World Bank, 1Nashington, D.C. 
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